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Archive for the Lunar Explorers category

 

The Matroshka AstroRad Radiation Experiment phantoms Helga and Zohar are installed in the passenger seats of the Artemis I Orion crew module at NASA's Kennedy Space Center, each torso packed with radiation detectors

 

Two mannequin torsos were strapped into the passenger seats of an Orion spacecraft at Kennedy Space Center in Florida in August 2022, and for 25 days they flew out past the Moon and back. They had no skin, no blood and no nerves. What they carried was the densest survey ever flown of what ionizing radiation does to a human body outside low Earth orbit: thousands of detectors buried in slices of tissue-equivalent material built to mimic bone, organ and skin, plus more than ten thousand small crystals logging every particle that passed through them (IFJ PAN, October 2026). The flight ended in December 2022; the readout is still running. A paper in Radiation Measurements published this past September put the smallest of those crystals, chips of lithium fluoride a few millimetres across, to work on a question that sounds simple and is not: how much radiation does a person actually absorb near the Moon, compared with a person working a few hundred kilometres up over the equator? The Moon is the worse place, and by a smaller margin than intuition insists.

Three particle populations decide what a crew receives. Galactic cosmic rays are the steady background, mostly protons with a thin tail of heavy nuclei at energies past 10^20 eV. Solar energetic particles arrive in bursts after a flare, mostly protons in the tens of megahelectronvolt range. The Van Allen belts hold geomagnetically trapped protons that dominate the radiation budget in low Earth orbit, then vanish as soon as a spacecraft climbs out of them. The three behave very differently against shielding. A few centimetres of water knocks down most of a solar energetic particle and does nothing useful against a galactic cosmic ray, which carries enough energy to cross metres of metal, plastic and water while showering secondary particles.

The useful question is not how much radiation exists but how much a body in a specific place collects. Inside the space station, the earlier Matroshka experiment found the dose piled into shallow tissue near the surface, where low-energy trapped protons dumped their energy early (IFJ PAN, 2026). NASA caps an astronaut’s career effective dose from spaceflight at 600 mSv and selects crews so their lifetime risk of radiation-induced death stays low (NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1). Every millisievert on that ledger is an engineering problem paid for in kilograms.

Artemis I was the first chance to measure any of it with a body in the room. Orion launched on 16 November 2022, flew past the Moon on 21 November at 130 kilometres and again on 5 December at 128 kilometres, and splashed down off San Diego on 11 December (Nature, December 2024). The Matroshka AstroRad Radiation Experiment, led by the German Aerospace Center with NASA and the Israel Space Agency, carried two headless female phantoms built from 38 slices of tissue-equivalent material. Helga flew bare, Zohar wore a prototype vest called AstroRad, and both torsos held more than 12,000 detectors between them (ESA, August 2026).

The first results, published in Nature in 2024, showed how much the spacecraft shapes the environment: dose rates inside Orion varied by a factor of four between the most and least shielded positions, and rotating the capsule during the inner-belt pass halved the dose rate as the thick axis swung into the proton plane (Nature, December 2024). Total absorbed dose across the mission reached 13.47 mGy at the least shielded location, and the two belt crossings still contributed up to 23 percent of that. No solar particle event occurred during the flight, and the only other change was the Moon itself, whose bulk blocked about a third of the cosmic ray flux during the close passes.

Two papers this year fill in the rest. A Science Advances study in August modelled the August 1972 solar storm, which fell between the Apollo 16 and Apollo 17 missions, and found the AstroRad vest could cut effective dose by 58.2 percent, worth up to 193 days of deep space exposure (ESA, 2026). Then in September, Pawel Bilski and colleagues at the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Polish Academy of Sciences reported the first quantitative use of fluorescent lithium fluoride track detectors from the lunar flyby (Bilski et al., 2026). The crystals are millimetre-scale chips grown by the Czochralski method, pulled slowly from a melt of purified lithium fluoride. Ionizing radiation leaves defects in the lattice that act as color centers, and under blue light those centers re-emit red fluorescence. Under a microscope, a heavy particle appears as a scratch in the crystal marking where energy was deposited.

Reading the pictures was easy. Extracting numbers was not, because cosmic rays arrive from every direction, so tracks wander out of the focal plane and blur into a background glow the camera collects with the sharp segment. Highly ionizing particles cut continuous lines, weakly ionizing ones leave dotted chains, and both change the fluorescence intensity that carries the ionization density. After corrections to subtract that background, the lithium fluoride results land within 15 percent of conventional etched track detectors across the overlapping energy range, and they pick up tracks below those detectors’ threshold (Bilski et al., 2026). The Krakow group also supplied nearly 600 thermoluminescent detectors, chips that store absorbed energy in the lattice and release it as light when heated.

The result underneath the instrument work is the headline: the dose inside the phantoms near the Moon came out essentially uniform, where the station data had been lumpy (Bilski et al., 2026). Trapped protons in low Earth orbit stop at different depths in a body, so they pile dose into the outer tissue. Galactic cosmic rays carry enough energy to cross a whole torso and deposit only a fraction of it along the way, so their dose spreads out almost evenly. The Van Allen contribution disappears near the Moon and the galactic contribution replacing it is larger, so the total goes up; the two effects partly cancel, and the margin is not the jump the geometry of the belts suggests. Dose equivalent still has to be computed with radiation weighting factors, H = sum_R w_R D_T,R, where protons count as one and alpha particles and heavy nuclei count as twenty, because heavy nuclei deliver a disproportionate share of biological damage per unit of absorbed dose (NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1). By that measure a crew on a lunar mission would spend a small fraction of a career’s allowance.

What the uniform dose map changes is design. If the dose is flat, shielding the skin buys little and every kilogram has to go somewhere with real mass: a storm shelter, a water-walled bunk or a berm of regolith on the surface. If the dose is lumpy, as it is in low Earth orbit, the same shelter can be tens of centimetres of structure parked behind the seats. The Moon is also a useful if temporary shield for the rest of the sky: during the Artemis I flybys it cut the cosmic ray dose by about a third simply by being in the way, one more argument for keeping habitats and crewed vehicles apart.

None of this replaces a crewed measurement. Artemis II carried four astronauts around the Moon in April 2026, the first people to leave low Earth orbit since Apollo 17 (NASA), and the missions behind it will wear the dosimeters these crystals have just calibrated. The value of the two papers this year is that they turn a vague dread into a number with an uncertainty attached, the only form in which radiation risk can be engineered against.

 

 

Artist's rendering of NASA's nuclear-powered PROMISE rover on the lunar surface, its mast camera head raised above a six-wheeled chassis built from spare Curiosity hardware.

 

On a Saturday morning at the MAX POWER aerospace expo at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, the agency handed out the paperwork for a supply chain. Almost none of what NASA announced was about a spacecraft that flies soon. Eight companies were put on a list to fly cargo to the lunar south pole. Six task orders were awarded for launches and orbital transfer vehicles, and one company took home $94 million to deliver a nuclear-powered rover that will drill into the Moon (NASA, November 2026). That rover is PROMISE, the Polar Rover for Observation, Mapping, and In-Situ Exploration. Everything else that day was about how that box gets there, and what happens to the power and spare parts after it lands.

The program itself is young. In March 2026, at an event NASA called Ignition, administrator Jared Isaacman laid out a Moon Base: humanity’s first outpost, assembled one mission at a time rather than in a single leap. “The moon base will not appear overnight,” he said at the time (CNN, March 2026). Eight months later the program is issuing contracts, and the shape of those contracts says what NASA thinks a base is. Not a habitat first. A logistics chain first, with the habitat waiting at the far end of it. NASA’s phased plan is blunt about it: Phase One, through 2029, is titled “Gain Reliable Access, Experiment, and Learn,” and every asset listed under it flies without a crew aboard.

Getting to the south pole is not mainly a distance problem. It is a problem of arriving with power and staying alive. The sun never climbs high there, so sunlight is weak and arrives at a grazing angle. Shadowed craters near Shackleton reach roughly -242 degrees Celsius, cold enough to freeze tanks and kill batteries. A lunar night lasts about 14 Earth days. And the polar ice that would make a base self-sufficient sits under meters of dust, findable only by drilling or by watching neutrons scatter off hydrogen. The hard part is not the pressure vessel. It is landing repeatedly at a named spot on a world with no roads and no rescue, using hardware somebody else owns.

That is where the November 7 announcements land. NASA’s new CLPS 2 on-ramp admits eight companies: Blue Origin, Firefly Aerospace, Intuitive Machines, ispace-US, Lockheed Martin Space, Northrop Grumman Space Systems, SpaceX and Voyager Technologies. They compete for lunar delivery missions under a ten-year multiple-award contract with a ceiling of $10 billion. NASA also raised the value of the original CLPS 1.0 vehicle from $2.6 billion to $4.2 billion for Phase One, while deliveries already awarded must finish by November 2033. The trade has changed: the company builds the lander, operates it and flies it, and NASA arrives with a payload and a delivery ticket.

The legs in between are covered by a second contract. NASA’s Venture-Class Acquisition of Dedicated and Rideshare vehicle is a ten-year indefinite-delivery contract with a $5 billion ceiling. Six task orders worth roughly $1.3 billion went to Arrow Science and Technology, Blue Origin and Impulse Space, in three shapes (NASA, November 2026). One carries CAPSTONE 02, a pair of small spacecraft, into deep space to rehearse rendezvous and navigation around the Moon. One sends JPL’s MoonFall drones to scout terrain before astronauts arrive. One tests commercial orbital transfer vehicles in cislunar orbits. Launches will ride New Glenn, Relativity’s Terran R and Falcon 9, with transfer vehicles from Blue Origin, Firefly, Impulse Space and Quantum Space. SpaceX, separately, won a cislunar communications demonstration that will put satellites on a Starship in 2028, and NASA will buy parts for miniCAST towers: solar arrays, batteries and wireless power transfer, assembled at Marshall.

And then there is the rover, where the engineering gets specific. Blue Origin will fly PROMISE to the surface on its Blue Moon Mark 1 lander, under the $94 million award and $140 million in options. The rover is six wheels on a Curiosity-derived chassis. JPL is building it from the electronics, body structure and mobility system of the duplicate Curiosity vehicle used as a test bed for the Mars mission, supplementing that with flight spares and test models left over from Curiosity and Perseverance. That shortens the path from a parts bin to a landing site. Power comes from a flight-spare Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator, a unit that supplies about 110 watts of electricity at the start of a mission (NASA Radioisotope Power Systems). A hundred watts looks trivial next to a solar array, but it does not stop at sunset, and at the pole there is always a sunset.

The payload surveys everything the base will need to know. A rotary percussive drill called TRIDENT, designed by Honeybee Robotics, a Blue Origin subsidiary, pulls regolith up from a meter down in 10-centimeter increments while measuring how strong and how warm the material is. A mass spectrometer at Kennedy and a near-infrared spectrometer at Ames read its chemistry. A Lockheed Martin neutron spectrometer looks for hydrogen. A radiometer built at Johns Hopkins, using technology from the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter’s Diviner instrument, measures temperatures down toward -242 degrees Celsius inside permanently shadowed terrain. Everything runs on NASA’s High Performance Spaceflight Computing, which NASA says delivers more than 100 times the capability of current space processors. With light taking about 1.3 seconds to cross the Earth-Moon distance each way, the rover has to decide things on its own.

That chain is worth the arithmetic, because NASA has split the old lunar lander into three or four separately purchased pieces. From low Earth orbit to the lunar surface is roughly 5.6 kilometers per second of delta-v: about 3.1 for translunar injection, 0.9 for lunar orbit insertion and 1.7 for the powered descent. Tsiolkovsky’s rocket equation, Δv = v_e * ln(m_0 / m_f), explains why nobody flies that whole profile as one vehicle. A chemical stage with an exhaust velocity near 3.5 kilometers per second needs a mass ratio above two just for the departure burn. A Hall thruster needs far less propellant, but it thrusts too low to sprint, and solar flux at the Moon is a twenty-third of Earth’s. Electric transfers pay off when the cargo can carry a huge array, which is why the chain is layered. Impulse Space’s two awards show the logic: Helios, a chemical kick stage, takes the expensive first leg, while Mira and a throttleable lander handle the maneuvers and the descent. Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 1 is scheduled to attempt a landing at the Shackleton Connecting Ridge, with SCALPSS cameras watching how engine plumes scour the ground. A second lander is booked to carry NASA’s VIPER rover in late 2027.

What to watch is not any single mission but the order they arrive in. Blue Moon’s Endurance landing attempt and CAPSTONE 02 both fly in 2027, followed by VIPER’s delivery, then the MoonFall drones, then PROMISE in late 2028 with its eighteen-month campaign. Every one of those dates assumes commercial hardware shows up on a schedule NASA does not control, at a place NASA does not own. The contracts do not make that harder. They make it financeable. An indefinite-delivery vehicle with a $10 billion ceiling turns a program of bespoke government spacecraft into a market where a lander operator has to show up repeatedly, not once, and where a failed delivery is somebody else’s problem. Whether the Moon Base ends up a settlement or a very expensive parking lot will be settled by how those eight companies perform over the next three years, long before anyone has to live there.

 

 

Artist's concept of Blue Origin's Blue Moon Mark 2 human landing system test article in Earth orbit and docked with NASA's Orion spacecraft, the side-mounted docking port beside the crew cabin visible (NASA)

 

NASA’s Artemis III does not land anyone on the Moon. It flies to low Earth orbit, carries no lander that touches a surface, and is built around a docking test between two commercial spacecraft and a NASA capsule. Two engineers who work on NASA’s Human Landing System program explained what the test involves on the most recent episode of the Johnson Space Center’s Houston We Have a Podcast.

The guests are Kent Criswell, lead systems engineer for HLS at Blue Origin, and Reid Ruggles, lead systems engineer for HLS at SpaceX. They describe a mission built around a problem that looks easy on paper. Docking in low Earth orbit is solved, has been since Gemini and perfected by the Shuttle and the ISS. What has never been attempted is doing it with hardware that two different companies built separately, on a schedule that depends on a third rocket landing on time.

NASA’s own program page lays out the sequence step by step, and NASA’s Artemis III mission page repeats it in detail. Artemis III is a 14-day flight sending Randy Bresnik, Frank Rubio, Andre Douglas, and ESA astronaut Luca Parmitano up on SLS from Kennedy, with the crew launching only after a Blue Origin lander test article is already in orbit and has passed its checkout. That article goes into a circular orbit roughly 273 miles above the surface and can loiter there for up to 30 days, which is the schedule cushion the rest of the sequence depends on. Starship flies later, since it has a much shorter on-orbit lifetime, and settles into a lower orbit at 206 nautical miles chosen for its communications coverage. Orion itself flies a circular orbit throughout, and all three vehicles have more launch opportunities available than a lunar trip would allow, which is what makes the tight sequence workable.

Each lander gets different hardware and a different set of test objectives. The Blue Moon article carries the real crew cabin, the environmental control and life support system, and enough avionics and flight software that NASA’s page describes it as an early look at how a commercial lander behaves as an integrated vehicle in space. Up to two crew members in orange survival suits open the hatch and go inside to assess the cabin environment and the controls firsthand, spending roughly two days aboard. An instrumented spacesuit mass simulator stands in for a person and reports on conditions inside the cabin in real time, the same trick the agency used with the suited Moonikin on Artemis I. SpaceX’s version is thinner, and the details are harder to come by. The Starship Version 3 article flies without a crew cabin and nobody goes inside it, and the demonstration runs up to two hours. For that leg, what matters is where the docking hardware sits and who flies the stack. Orion connects to Blue Moon along the side of the vehicle, next to the crew cabin, and Orion’s software controls the joined stack once the two are mated. Later, Orion aligns nose to nose with the Starship article, and the SpaceX test article takes over control of the stack. The mission covers two docking geometries, and two different companies hold the controls.

Ruggles describes what low Earth orbit does to Orion that deep space does not. In orbit, a spacecraft moving from full sun into Earth’s shadow can swing from hundreds of degrees Fahrenheit to something near freezing inside forty-five minutes, and metal in a docking mechanism expands and contracts with that cycle, changing the hardware that has to mate. Orion’s thermal control system was built for deep space, and low Earth orbit is not that. Light bouncing off Earth is a steady heat input that a lunar polar orbit does not deliver in the same way, since the Moon’s surface is far less reflective. Getting Orion into the shadow of a lander also breaks the tail-to-sun attitude that keeps the capsule thermally stable, a constraint that did not exist in the mission designs the capsule was originally drawn for.

There is also an optical problem. Ruggles notes that Orion has to acquire its target visually, and that the target’s surface finish changes how it looks. Bare stainless steel reflects differently from a vehicle painted in AZ-93 white, the standard space paint used across the industry, and the acquisition software has to cope with both. He also raises the case of Orion’s own thrusters firing close to a station-keeping lander, a plume impingement problem that cannot be replicated on the ground, because ground tests do not run one spacecraft’s thrusters against another parked vehicle.

The rehearsal stops short of the landing. Both engineers are clear that the real risk sits in the landing itself, where the exhaust plume interacts with the regolith and the vehicle has to find a safe spot among craters, hills, and boulders tens of feet tall. Ruggles calls the uncrewed demonstration mission the linchpin, because it is the first time either company will show that its lander can reach the Moon, land, stay, and lift off again. Criswell, describing Blue Origin’s Mark 1 robotic south pole landing, notes that the uncrewed demonstration comes after Artemis III and that Blue Origin chose to exceed the contract by flying the uncrewed mission for the same duration as the crewed one and ascending back off the surface. NASA built the HLS contracts in the order that worked for the ISS, where an uncrewed demonstration comes before the crewed one, and both companies say they have already qualified their docking hardware on the ground, with SpaceX doing so in 2023 and Blue Origin running pressurized docking tests earlier this year. What remains untested in Earth orbit is the thermal environment a real lunar descent brings, where the sun angle is low, the surface is cold and dark, and the landing plume has to be contained by an engine that has not yet flown.

Both engineers make the same point. Ruggles argues that Apollo succeeded because the program climbed from Mercury to Gemini to Apollo, letting hardware and crews build up in steps, and notes that the agency has not attempted deep space missions in a long time. Criswell puts it more bluntly, pointing out that one company doing something does not mean everyone can. NASA supports the providers with collaboration work worth roughly 80 person-years each, shared through thermal analysis of cryogenic boil-off, landing site selection standards, and propulsion rules written over six decades of agency experience. Artemis III puts two commercial landers, one NASA capsule, and three separate launch campaigns on one timeline, and works through the docking in low Earth orbit before anyone rides a lander down to the south pole.

Artist’s concept of Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 2 test article docked with Orion in Earth orbit. Credit: NASA, from NASA’s Human Landing System program page.

 

 

NASA's Artemis III operations concept graphic showing New Glenn launching the Blue Moon Mark 2 lander test article, the Space Launch System launching from pad 39B, and Starship launching a lander test article from pad 39A, with the sequence of Orion docking checks through splashdown in low Earth orbit.

 

Getting American astronauts back to the lunar surface now depends on three rockets that mostly do not look alike, and on the fact that all three are changing at once. On 23 October 2026, at a press conference at Kennedy Space Center, NASA laid out how Artemis III will be flown, and the answer was a rehearsal, not a landing. Four astronauts will launch on the Space Launch System in 2027, dock with a test Blue Moon lander and a test Starship in Earth orbit, and come home. The landing itself moves to Artemis IV in 2028, and the first crew on the surface since Apollo 17 will ride on whichever of the two commercial landers proves ready first (NASA’s release on the revised plan).

That rework set off a hardware sprint across three launch pads. Each vehicle is getting a new upper stage, a new engine, or a whole new configuration, and the changes are not interchangeable. SLS is losing the upgrade it was supposed to get and gaining a different one. Starship is getting a docking adapter, a tanker fleet and an upper stage for its own lander. New Glenn is getting a bigger first stage, a rebuilt pad and a four-launch plan that was not in the original design. Side by side, the three are three answers to one question: how do you get a crew to the Moon and back without flying the same hardware twice?

The reordering also exposes an uncomfortable schedule. NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman announced the new sequence roughly a month before Artemis II lifted off in April 2026, and officials now describe Artemis III as an Earth-orbit test in mid-2027, with Artemis IV and Artemis V both aimed at landings in 2028 (SpacePolicyOnline on the schedule). The South Pole remains the destination, justified by water ice thought to be accessible in permanently shadowed terrain, though the agency concedes it needs more data from robotic landers before committing. The suits are being built by Axiom Space. One detail is significant: the docking test happens in low Earth orbit rather than near the Moon, letting NASA learn the hard parts of rendezvous while a crew is still a quick flight from the splashdown.

The Space Launch System is the odd one out, the only one of the three being simplified. NASA’s original plan was a Block 1 rocket with the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage for the first missions, then a Block 1B with Boeing’s larger Exploration Upper Stage and a Block 2 with new solid boosters. That ladder was dropped in February 2026; the agency settled on a standardized configuration and picked ULA’s Centaur V as the upper stage to replace the interim stage from Artemis IV onward (Space.com on the upper-stage selection). Centaur V has flown on Vulcan since 2024 and holds roughly twice the propellant of the interim stage, and NASA is working with ULA on an extended version for the low-lunar-orbit role the new architecture calls for (Ars Technica on the revised architectures). For Artemis III itself, SLS will fly without a propulsion stage at all, using a non-propulsive spacer instead, since the mission never leaves Earth orbit.

Starship’s contribution to the same plan is the most expensive one, and the most contested. Under the revised concept, tanker variants of Starship fill a depot ship in low Earth orbit, the lander and Orion dock there, and the lander performs the burn that sends the combined stack toward the Moon (NASA’s release on the revised plan). How many tankers that takes is the argument. At a NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel meeting, panel member and former astronaut Charlie Precourt put the estimate at around 22 flights, noting the large number of firsts stacked against Artemis IV. Elon Musk responded that the real figure would be closer to six to eight (Ars Technica on the tanker estimate). The gap is not just numerical. It depends on how much cryogenic methane and liquid oxygen boil off in orbit and how efficiently the transfer works, neither yet demonstrated. Even at a twice-weekly launch rate by the end of 2027, Ars Technica’s analysis puts the time to fuel a single depot at roughly three months.

New Glenn is the third rocket, and it is carrying the most physical damage. On 28 May 2026, a static fire at Cape Canaveral destroyed a fully stacked New Glenn and much of Launch Complex 36. Blue Origin traced the anomaly to the main liquid oxygen valve on one of the seven BE-4 engines in the first stage, with the root cause still open at the time of reporting, and began rebuilding the pad in June with a public target of returning to flight before the end of 2026 (KeepTrack on the LC-36 explosion and recovery). The rebuilt pad, LC-36A, flies the current 7×2 configuration, while LC-36B is being built for the heavier 9×4. New Glenn has flown three times, its third on 19 April 2026 ending with the loss of the payload, and its November 2025 ESCAPADE booster reused on that attempt. All of that sits underneath a lander campaign that needs the rocket to fly four times.

The engineering behind the new variants is where the three programs diverge most sharply. New Glenn 9×4 replaces the current 7×2 with nine BE-4 engines on the first stage and four BE-3Us on the upper stage, carries a fairing widened from 7 metres to 8.7 metres, and lifts roughly 70 metric tons to low Earth orbit against 45 tons for the original configuration, with the engine upgrades phased in starting with the third mission (Space.com on the 9×4 variant). Starship’s lunar lander and its depot ship shed hardware rather than adding it: neither re-enters Earth’s atmosphere, so both drop the heat shield and the fins, and the lander keeps six Raptor engines for ascent and landing while separate high-thrust engines in the mid-body burn gaseous oxygen and methane to avoid blasting the regolith (Wikipedia on the Starship HLS vehicle family). Blue Moon takes the opposite approach, keeping liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen with a solar-powered system that holds propellant near 20 kelvin to fight boiloff, which matters for a lander meant to sit on the Moon rather than leave (Wikipedia on the Blue Moon lander family). And beneath all of it, the crew rocket changes hands: from Artemis V, NASA plans to transfer SLS production and launch operations to Deep Space Transport LLC, a Boeing and Northrop Grumman joint venture, hoping commercial customers spread the cost (Wikipedia on Deep Space Transport LLC).

The three vehicles have also started flying. Starship reached orbit for the first time on 28 September 2026 on flight test 14, deploying 26 operational Starlink V3 satellites after one of the six second-stage engines shut down early, which cut the planned six-orbit profile short but not the orbit itself (SpacePolicyOnline on the first orbital flight). For Artemis III, the sequence runs to a 14-day nominal mission: New Glenn goes first with the Blue Moon test article, SLS launches the crew next, and Starship flies on about flight day six to dock on day eight, with the Blue Moon docking on day three at roughly 273 miles (Space.com on the concept of operations).

What ties the three together is the 2028 landing, and what separates them is how each program pays for it. Blue Origin chose the conservative route, deferring in-orbit propellant transfer and instead flying three transfer stages built from existing Mark 1 and Mark 2 hardware ahead of the Blue Moon Mark 2 Alpha lander, which assembles in Earth orbit and departs for an elliptical polar orbit around the Moon. That is four New Glenn launches with no spacecraft-to-spacecraft refueling, on a booster whose pad was vaporized in May. SpaceX chose the opposite, betting that orbital refueling works well enough that a handful of tanker flights will cover the lander, a bet its own safety advisory board thinks is off by more than a factor of three. NASA bought optionality by choosing neither, flying both dockings in Earth orbit in 2027 and deciding the landing provider from what the data shows. The next real milestone is not a landing but a docking, and the hardware that has to make it work is still in pads and test stands.

NASA’s Artemis III operations concept graphic, showing the three launch vehicles and the docking sequence in low Earth orbit.

 

 

NASA's Artemis III operations concept graphic showing the Moon above the Earth, with a New Glenn, the Space Launch System and a Starship all flying in low Earth orbit

 

NASA’s Artemis III operations concept graphic has the Moon above the Earth and three rockets lined up beneath it: a New Glenn carrying a Blue Origin lander test article, the Space Launch System carrying Orion, and a Starship carrying a second test article. All three fly in low Earth orbit, and none goes to the Moon. That is the plan Administrator Jared Isaacman, Associate Administrator Amit Kshatriya and Artemis Program Manager Jeremy Parsons presented at Kennedy Space Center on October 23, and it reverses the promise that defined the program for a decade. Artemis III, the mission built to put astronauts back on the surface, is now a two-week low Earth orbit flight targeted for mid-2027, with four astronauts docking first with a Blue Origin test lander and then with a SpaceX Starship. The first landing since Apollo 17 moves to Artemis IV in early 2028.

Artemis II cleared the way, launching on April 1, 2026 and flying four astronauts around the Moon on a free-return trajectory, 406,771 kilometres from Earth at closest, before splashing down in the Pacific ten days later (Wikipedia, Artemis II). The mission worked, but the arithmetic behind the schedule never changed. The European Service Module, the Airbus-built element that powers Orion and pushes it around, lacks the delta-v to return from low lunar orbit; in Apollo the lunar module was the crew’s lifeboat, and in Artemis the lander must do that job and more (Wikipedia, European Service Module).

That lifeboat arrangement had a staging point, the Lunar Gateway, and NASA cancelled it in March 2026. A month before Artemis II flew, Isaacman had already restructured the flight sequence so Artemis III would stay in Earth orbit and Artemis IV would attempt the landing (Wikipedia, Artemis III). The pressure sits on the parts NASA does not build: both commercial landers are behind schedule, as is Axiom’s spacesuit, and the FY2026 budget request proposed ending SLS and Orion after Artemis III, citing a launch cost of about $4 billion (Wikipedia, Artemis III).

The flight plan is specific enough to be built. Blue Origin goes first, with a lander test article lifted off New Glenn from Launch Complex 36A carrying a crew module, avionics, partial life support and a reaction control system but no main propulsion. It can loiter in orbit for weeks, which is why it launches first, and Blue Origin would spend about two weeks checking it out before Orion flies (Wikipedia, Artemis III). Orion follows on an SLS Block 1 from Pad 39-B with an inert structural spacer in place of the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage, since the mission never leaves low Earth orbit and does not need that stage’s RL10 engine (Wikipedia, Artemis III and Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage).

Orion is the chaser in both encounters, holding station while the passive target keeps its orientation, with time for another attempt if the first docking fails. Once mated, the crew stays about two days, equalises pressure in the Blue Moon vestibule with Orion’s atmosphere, opens the hatch and goes inside to check cabin habitability and the interfaces between the lander and Axiom’s AxEMU suit (Wikipedia, Artemis III). After undocking, a standard Starship v3 with a passive docking fitting on its nose cone launches from Pad 39-A, and Orion docks with it briefly without the crew leaving the capsule, because that vehicle has no crew cabin and no life support. The point is control: verifying that Starship can hold the attitude of a combined stack with Orion attached. Orion comes home on an upgraded heat shield and splashes down off San Diego for Navy recovery.

What the rehearsal is for became clearer in the briefing charts. Two landing architectures are on the table and NASA has not chosen between them. In the Starship version, Orion docks with a Starship Human Landing System in low Earth orbit and Starship pushes both vehicles to the Moon, which needs a propellant depot and several tanker flights to move cryogenic methane and oxygen in orbit, a manoeuvre never demonstrated at scale (SpacePolicyOnline, October 23, 2026). In the Blue Moon version, three transfer stages on New Glenn push the lander to lunar orbit while Orion flies straight to the Moon. Each company must land uncrewed first, and NASA intends “to wait as long as possible” before choosing the provider that carries the first crew back (CBS News, October 23, 2026). NASA will also accept a lighter “sortie” suit with about two hours on the surface (SpacePolicyOnline, October 23, 2026).

The destination is unsettled. Kshatriya conceded that NASA’s knowledge of the south pole is thin, while Isaacman called it “probably the most advantageous area” for ice in permanently shadowed terrain, and a National Academies report in mid-October identified four non-polar sites with scientific value (SpacePolicyOnline, October 23, 2026). NASA’s Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel objected a day earlier to requiring only one uncrewed landing per provider and to putting cryogenic propellant on the Moon for the first time (SpacePolicyOnline, October 22, 2026). China is aiming for a crewed landing by 2030 (CBS News, October 23, 2026).

The propulsion problem underneath is arithmetic. Orion’s service module carries 8,600 kg of usable MON-3/MMH propellant and flies one AJ10 main engine at 26.6 kN, eight R-4D thrusters and 24 smaller reaction control units (Wikipedia, European Service Module). A direct rendezvous profile asks that stack to leave Earth, arrive at the Moon and come home: roughly 3,100 m/s for the translunar injection, a few hundred for lunar orbit insertion, about 900 m/s to come back, close to 4,800 m/s in total. The rocket equation says what that costs: Δv = v_e * ln(m_0 / m_f), with v_e = Isp * 9.80665. At a generous 300 seconds of specific impulse, exhaust velocity is about 2,940 m/s, so 4,800 m/s demands a mass ratio near 5, and Orion would have to burn four-fifths of its own mass.

The cheap way to buy delta-v is not a bigger spacecraft but a cryogenic stage, because hydrogen’s chemical energy per kilogram is roughly three times that of the hypergolic mix and empty tanks are cheap. The Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage that flew Artemis II shows the arithmetic: a single RL10 at 110.1 kN, specific impulse 462 seconds, gross mass 32,748 kg, empty mass 3,800 kg, so Δv = 462 * 9.80665 * ln(32,748 / 3,800) comes to about 9,700 m/s, roughly double the whole cislunar budget (Wikipedia, Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage). NASA is now working with United Launch Alliance on an extended Centaur V to fly with the SLS core stage, so the launch vehicle can inject Orion to low lunar orbit and leave the service module’s small tank for the lunar leg and the return (Ars Technica, October 24, 2026).

The orbit where the vehicles meet matters as much as the propulsion. NASA’s charts show Orion and the Blue Moon lander joining in an elliptical lunar orbit with an apolune near 8,500 km, which lets a lander with limited propellant reach the surface; Parsons said a low lunar orbit a few hundred kilometres up would cut the lander’s propellant requirement substantially (Ars Technica, October 24, 2026; Wikipedia, Artemis IV). Docking adds its own problem: Orion is the active vehicle, the other side passive, and with Starship the mass difference is roughly an order of magnitude, so a closing speed of a few centimetres per second is the difference between a soft mate and a bent structure. Isaacman’s summary of the fix was blunt: reaching low lunar orbit means “solving propulsion and spacecraft integration problems that were left unaddressed for far too long” (Ars Technica, October 24, 2026).

The most useful thing NASA did on October 23 was turn a landing into a list of things that can be checked, in an orbit where a failed rendezvous ends in a re-entry within hours instead of a rescue measured in days. What Artemis III will not settle is the hardest part: the test articles are stripped of the systems that make the real flight hard, with no main engine on the Blue Origin vehicle and no life support aboard Starship. Those are the 2028 problems, and they will be solved, if at all, by the two companies racing each other to be ready. The long-lead hardware keeps renewing in the meantime: on October 21 an RS-25 fired for 500 seconds on the Fred Haise Test Stand at Stennis, reaching 111 percent of the thrust needed to launch SLS (NASA, October 21, 2026). Apollo was a state program with one rocket and one schedule. Artemis is a procurement program that has to fit itself around two private launch cadences, and the first way NASA tests that arrangement is to launch three rockets and see whether they can find each other.

 

October 11, 2026

The Moon could anchor Earth’s GPS

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The proposed four-ELFO constellation around the Moon, with orbits labeled ELF01 through ELF04 in green, viewed from above the lunar north pole. The elongated ellipses are the Elliptical Lunar Frozen Orbits designed to provide continuous coverage of the lunar south pole while remaining stable with minimal station-keeping. Figure 4 from Lin et al. 2026 (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s43020-026-00217-9/figures/4), reproduced under CC BY 4.0.

 

A constellation of navigation satellites can measure the distance between each member with centimeter accuracy and still, slowly, lose track of which way the whole network is pointing. That is the awkward truth at the heart of every Global Navigation Satellite System on Earth, and it is the puzzle researchers at Shanghai’s Microsatellites Engineering Center set out to solve on 17 September 2026 with a paper in Satellite Navigation, announced through EurekAlert. The lead authors were Xia Lin and Baojun Lin, two of the center’s senior engineers. Their answer was to extend the network 384,000 kilometers outward and let four satellites in elliptical orbits around the Moon serve as a gravitational anchor. The result, written up in the open-access journal under a CC BY 4.0 license, is the first end-to-end demonstration that real BeiDou-3 inter-satellite data, paired with simulated lunar cross-links, can keep an autonomous navigation system stable to within roughly 35 centimeters of User Range Error over 60 days, an order of magnitude better than the BeiDou-only baseline.

The reason a spaceborne navigation system needs an anchor at all is that inter-satellite ranging, the technique GPS pioneered in the 1990s and that every modern GNSS now uses to back up its ground stations, has a built-in symmetry problem. Each satellite measures its distance to its neighbors. Those measurements fix the relative geometry of the constellation with high precision, but they cannot distinguish one orientation of the whole network from another, because rotating the constellation rigidly in space leaves every inter-satellite distance exactly the same. Engineers call this property an orientational rank deficiency, and the symptom it produces is a slow rotational drift in the right ascension of the ascending node, the angle that defines where each orbital plane points in inertial space. Without ground-station updates, even a state-of-the-art autonomous system like BeiDou’s accumulates error at a rate of meters per month, which is why every GNSS operator still maintains an expensive global network of monitoring stations as a backup.

The Lin et al. solution exploits a simple geometric fact. A satellite in Earth orbit experiences the Earth’s gravity, which is nearly symmetric about the rotational axis. A satellite in a tight elliptical orbit around the Moon experiences the Moon’s gravity, which is not aligned with Earth’s axis at all. If the entire BeiDou-plus-lunar network were rotated incorrectly as a rigid body, the Earth-orbiting and Moon-orbiting members would no longer respond to their respective gravitational environments in the same way. Earth-Moon cross-links therefore carry information that Earth-only links cannot, and that information breaks the symmetry. The team quantified the change in a particularly clean way. They computed the condition number of the information matrix, a standard mathematical measure of how well-posed a least-squares problem is. For 24 BeiDou Medium Earth Orbit satellites alone, the condition number sat between roughly 10^15 and 10^18, the signature of a numerically singular system. Adding four simulated ELFO satellites dropped the condition number to about 10^2, a fourteen-orders-of-magnitude improvement that signals the symmetry has been fully broken.

The team’s experimental setup is unusually faithful for a navigation study, because half of it is real. They pulled actual on-orbit inter-satellite-link measurements from the operational BeiDou-3 MEO constellation, whose Ka-band TDMA cross-links can resolve ranges with noise floors near 10 centimeters, and combined those measurements with a simulated four-satellite constellation in Elliptical Lunar Frozen Orbits. The ELFO geometry, with four satellites in nearly identical, carefully chosen orbits arranged 90 degrees apart in node, is the same architecture that ESA’s Moonlight initiative and NASA’s LunaNet concept have independently converged on for lunar relay coverage, because ELFOs offer long dwell times over the south pole and remain stable with minimal station-keeping. The team used the well-characterized Sirbu et al. four-ELFO design and ran a 60-day simulation from October through December 2020, processing the BDS-3 data through a Kalman filter that jointly estimated the orbits of all 28 satellites along with clock offsets and Earth rotation parameters. The team also tested the architecture against an additional intermediate scenario in which the BeiDou satellites were allowed to use predicted orbit corrections on their own, an option that captures what an operator could realistically do for the first few weeks of a ground-station outage before the predicted-ephemeris quality decays.

Without any ground-station correction at all, the constellation in the unmitigated scenario drifted by about 7.85 meters of User Range Error after two months. Adding predicted orbital parameters as a partial constraint improved that to 0.6 meters. Adding the four ELFO cross-links dropped it to 0.35 meters, and the three-axis rotation bias was suppressed to 13.59, 10.27, and 4.04 milliarcseconds over the full 60 days. Crucially, the same cross-links help the lunar satellites, too: the four ELFO orbiters reached a maximum three-dimensional position error of 2.26 meters, with radial, along-track, and cross-track components below 0.16 m, 1.7 m, and 1.8 m respectively. The architecture is genuinely two-way. Earth-bound satellites help pin the Moon-bound satellites, and the Moon-bound satellites help pin the Earth-bound ones.

The reason this is more than a clean numerical result is that the cislunar navigation constellations ESA and NASA are actively planning to build for crewed lunar surface operations now have a second job description, as The Brighter Side of News explained in its coverage of the paper. ESA’s Moonlight and NASA’s LunaNet have both been framed primarily as services for south-pole landers, rovers, and astronauts, but if the Lin et al. result holds up in operational hardware, the same lunar relay satellites will quietly double as a stability anchor for the GNSS networks that every other piece of modern infrastructure depends on. A four-satellite lunar constellation costs a small fraction of a full ground-station refresh, and unlike ground stations it cannot be knocked out by a regional communications failure, a cyberattack, or a natural disaster.

Several caveats apply. The lunar portion of the experiment is a simulation, not flight data, and the joint condition-number analysis assumes the Earth-Moon cross-link can be timed to roughly the same precision as the existing BeiDou-3 Ka-band cross-links, which today is straightforward in principle but has not been demonstrated in hardware at 384,000-kilometer range. The 60-day window is also short for a real constellation; whether the drift suppression holds over years, through solar maximum, and across lunar eclipse seasons remains open. The Lin et al. paper is, in their own framing, a preliminary analysis, the first credible end-to-end case that the geometry works, not the last word. The team is appropriately careful about that. The next step that matters is a flight demonstration, likely as a hosted payload on one of the early Moonlight or LunaNet spacecraft, that closes an actual Earth-Moon cross-link and measures the rotational bias suppression directly. The result, when it comes, will tell us whether the 0.35-meter number survives contact with reality. If it does, the architecture of every future GNSS is going to have a footnote about the Moon.