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The complexity of aerospace systems is increasing exponentially. Both hardware and software subsystems are becoming more complex and encompassing systems’ behaviour becomes difficult to model due to the dependencies, relationships, and other interactions between their components. Predictable behaviour of complex aerospace systems translates into the reliability of each of their subsystems.

According to published reports the amount of total counterfeiting globally has reached 1.2 trillion USD in 2017, and it is predicted to reach 1.82 trillion USD by 2020. Counterfeiting affects all industries, aerospace and defence included. It turns out that identifying counterfeit components in the aerospace and defence supply chain is really challenging. In 2011 it was estimated that up to 15% of spare parts and replacement used by the US military were counterfeit. In a 9-page report dated November 4, 2016, obtained by Reuters through a freedom of information request, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) said 273 affected parts were installed in an unspecified number of Boeing 777 wing spoilers.

Having counterfeit components entering the aerospace market leads to decreased reliability of subsystems used in the aerospace industry. The consequences of using unreliable components in the aerospace and defense industries should not be underestimated or ignored for that matter. Parts that are manufactured for launch systems, spacecraft, aircraft, and weapon systems, and do not meet the required specifications should stay out of the supply chain.

There are various counterfeiting methods. Just to give an example, counterfeiting methods employed in the electronics supply chain include:

• Remarking of new or already used components with false manufacturer names, part numbers, date codes, lot numbers, quality levels. One way to identify remarked electronics is to engage the original manufacturers. However, there were cases when remarking was performed by the original manufacturer.
• Reuse of already used components. The increasing recycling of electronics is causing this trend. Certain countries import used electronics and return to the marketplace components removed from the discarded circuit boards.
• Outsourcing production to production facilities that are not employing proper testing or do not meet specifications.
• False approval markings used by manufacturers that skip the required certification process.

In order to protect itself, the aerospace and defense industry enforces quality management systems standards. The AS9100 standard is a quality management systems standard that includes requirements for aviation, space, and defense organizations. The AS9100 standard includes ISO 9001 quality management system requirements and, in addition, specifies aviation, space, and defense industry requirements. It is important to note that the requirements contained in AS9100 are complementary to existing customer or applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. Also, the customer or applicable statutory and regulatory requirements take precedence. The requirements of the standard are applicable to any organization, regardless of type, size, products or services it provides.

AS9100 defines counterfeit product as “An unauthorized copy, imitation, substitute, or modified part, which is knowingly misrepresented as a specified genuine part of an original or authorized manufacturer. NOTE: Examples of a counterfeit part (e.g., material, part, component) can include, but are not limited to, the false identification of marking or labeling, grade, serial number, date code, documentation, or performance characteristics.”

How is AS9100 helping combat the acceptance of counterfeit components in the aerospace and defense supply chain? A number of AS9100 clauses provide requirements relating to the mitigation and prevention of counterfeit components. These clauses are Counterfeit Part Prevention, Control of External Providers, and Information to External Providers. The Counterfeit Part Prevention clause states: “the organization shall plan, implement and control a process appropriate to the product that prevents the use of counterfeit product and either inclusion in product(s) delivered to the customer.”

Also, the Control of Nonconforming Outputs clause requires “counterfeit, or suspect counterfeit, parts shall be controlled to prevent reentry into the supply chain. Unsalvageable and counterfeit parts shall be conspicuously and permanently marked, or positively controlled, until physically rendered unusable to prevent restoration.”

The aerospace industry continues to allow manufacturers to maintain sole responsibility for their own manufacturing records. Also, the proliferation of practices known as “source delegation” and “self-regulation” place the responsibility for supporting documentation solely in the hands of suppliers. While the above-mentioned AS9100 clauses can help alleviate some of these issues, there is an immediate need for supply chain traceability. Employing an industry-wide supply chain database and guaranteeing access to all quality-related documentation seems to offer effective means for countering counterfeit components in the aerospace and defense industry.

References and other useful links:

Counterfeit examples for electronic components

Wikipedia article on AS9100 standard

Quality digest article on AS9100 standard

ESA dixit:

“The 700 tonne steel table that will support Ariane 6 at liftoff was transferred to the pad at Europe’s Spaceport in French Guiana on 10 September 2018. It is so large that it arrived in parts by ship in February and was then welded together and fitted with equipment at a preparation area 250 m from the launch pad.

Moving this giant 4 m high, 20 m long and 18 m wide table to its permanent position on the centre of the pad is complex. Four hydraulic jacks lifted the table then two trollies moved the table to the edge of the launch pad. A temporary railway and a mechanical guidance system helped roll the table into position over the centre of the pad where it will be lowered with millimeter precision into its final position. Further mechanical, fluidic and electrical equipment will be installed inside and outside the table.”

Video Credit: ESA / CNES

ESA dixit:

“At the end of 2019 Vega-C will be launched from Europe’s Spaceport in French Guiana increasing performance from Vega’s current 1.5 t to about 2.2 t in its reference 700 km polar orbit, with no increase in launch costs. Vega-C’s first stage is based on the P120, the largest single segment carbon fibre solid-propellant rocket motor ever built. It was successfully tested in July 2018. Its development relies on new technologies derived from Vega’s current first stage P80 motor. Two or four P120C motors will also be used for the liftoff boosters on Ariane 6.

Vega-C’s 3.3 m diameter fairing will accommodate larger payloads such as Earth observation satellites of more than two tonnes, and ESA’s Space Rider reentry vehicle. The Vega launch pad and mobile gantry are being modified to accommodate Vega-C leading into a period when launch facilities will accommodate both vehicles. ”

Video Credit: ESA

Northrop Grumman Corporation dixit:

“Northrop Grumman Corporation conducted its first ground test of a 63-inch diameter Graphite Epoxy Motor (GEM 63) today in Promontory, Utah. Utilizing advanced technologies, the company developed this new rocket motor for use on the United Launch Alliance (ULA) Atlas V launch vehicle.

Northrop Grumman began developing the motor just three years ago, reaching this static test milestone in rapid time for such a complex drop-in solution to an existing launch vehicle. The team developed the innovative design that tailors motor performance to meet ULA design objectives under a cooperative development program.”

Video Credit: Northrop Grumman Corporation

NASA dixit:

On the cusp of our atmosphere live a thin group of seasonal electric blue clouds. Forming 50 miles above the poles in summer, these clouds are known as noctilucent clouds or polar mesospheric clouds — PMCs. A recent NASA long-duration balloon mission observed these clouds over the course of five days at their home in the mesosphere. The resulting photos, which scientists have just begun to analyze, will help us better understand turbulence in the atmosphere, as well as in oceans, lakes and other planetary atmospheres, and may even improve weather forecasting.

On July 8, 2018, NASA’s PMC Turbo mission launched a giant balloon to study PMCs at a height of 50 miles above the surface. For five days, the balloon floated through the stratosphere from its launch at Esrange, Sweden, across the Arctic to Western Nunavut, Canada. During its flight, cameras aboard the balloon captured 6 million high-resolution images filling up 120 terabytes of data storage — most of which included a variety of PMC displays, revealing the processes leading to turbulence. Scientists are now beginning to go through the images and the first look has been promising.

Read more about this story…

Video Credit: NASA

Wikipedia dixit:

ICESat-2 is a follow-up to the original ICESat mission, which was decommissioned in 2010. When the project entered its first phase in 2010, it was expected to be ready for launch as soon as 2015. In December 2012, NASA reported that they expected the project to launch in 2016. In the following years, technical issues with the mission’s only onboard instrument, ATLAS, delayed the mission further, pushing the expected launch back from late 2016 to May 2017. In July 2014, NASA submitted a report to Congress detailing the reasons for the delay and a projected budget overrun, as is required by law for NASA projects which spend at least 15% over budget. In order to finance the budget overrun, NASA has diverted funds from other planned satellite missions, such as the Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem (PACE) satellite. The launch took place on 15 September 2018 at 15:02 UTC from Vandenberg Air Force Base Space Launch Complex 2 aboard a Delta 2 7420-10C. To maintain data continuity in the interim between the decommissioning of ICESat and the launch of ICESat-2, NASA’s airborne Operation IceBridge mission has continued to collect polar topography data using its onboard ATM lidar sensor.

Video Credit: ULA